Response to Brown by Kolbe, A. Lawrence et al.




We very much appreciate the opportunity to comment briefly on Professor
Brown's review1 of our book, Regulatory Risk: Economic Principles and
Applications to Natural Gas Pipelines and Other Industries ("Regulatory
Risk").2 Professor Brown's review expresses concern that our book: (1) does
not address a wider set of issues, (2) addresses issues that are rapidly
becoming obsolete due to growing competition, and (3) offers analogies to
matters such as "moral hazard" that needlessly create controversy.
In a sense, our book adequately speaks for itself regarding objections to
the theory of asymmetric risk as it applies to regulated firms.3 However, we
fear many will never get to those arguments if they rely upon Professor
Brown's characterization of the relevancy of these concepts. Any potential
inquiry into this important debate could be prematurely terminated for any who
rely upon Professor Brown's view that our work evidences "narrowness and
lack of timeliness. 4
With respect to Professor Brown's first concern, our book is definitely a
monograph. If it succeeds in getting the basic idea across, as it evidently has
done for Professor Brown, it has accomplished its chief purpose. (His review
does demonstrate our failure to explain all of the details well enough so that
they can be fully understood by all readers.) We certainly agree another book
could have addressed many other issues, although we do not agree that the
issues we do address are as narrow as Professor Brown appears to believe.
Moreover, we strongly disagree that the issues we raise are no longer relevant.
As we attempted to convey in our book-perhaps not as successfully as
we had hoped, if Professor Brown's is a representative response-"regulatory
risk" is simply a special case of "asymmetric risk." We now use the more
1. Ashley C. Brown, 13 YALE J. ON REG. (1995).
2. A. LAWRENCE KOLBE ET AL. REGULATORY RISK: ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS TO NATURAL GAS PIPELINES AND OTHER INDUSTRIES (1993).
3. See id. at 65-114. We will pass over responses to comments we have already adequately
addressed in the book, such as those criticizing us for alleged "strong bias," Brown, supra note
1, at 411, as evidenced by the alleged "failure of the authors even to reference the possibility of
symmetry in the changes in the rules of the game," id. at 410-11, favoring investors. See KOLBE,
supra note 2, at 83 (discussing this concern as objection number ten). As we indicate, "these
claims cannot be addressed except with a systematic study of the facts in particular circumstances."
Id. at 106-107. In this spirit, we address this issue in detail in our analysis of the gas pipeline
industry. Id. at 197-280.
4. Brown, supra note 1, at 404.
5. See KOLBE, supra note 2, at 115-36.
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general term to describe the generic problem. 6 Such risks do not go away
simply when regulators recede from the picture.
Firms previously subject to strict cost of service regulation (rate base/rate
of return) are not going "cold turkey" to a new regime of competition.7 In
the process of a transition to deregulation, asymmetric risk is at the heart of
the dispute over the appropriate rules during the transition.8 Even where a
transition to deregulation has been accomplished, there will likely be continued
regulation of bottleneck facilities, residual obligations to serve, and other
remaining obligations of incumbent firms. By nature, these issues are likely
to involve asymmetric risks.
Examples of 0two problems encountered in these regulatory debates can
serve to illustrate the point that the theory's application to a broad range of
current issues is far from "exclusively theoretical" and "narrow." In a recent
proceeding in Hawaii, regulators were asked to determine whether investors
in an electric utility had previously been compensated for the risks of incurring
hurricane restoration costs that amounted to 80 percent of the prior rate base.
If so, a case might be made that the investors, and not ratepayers, should bear
these costs. At the end of the proceeding, even a spokesperson for ratepayer
interests agreed that the economic principles in Regulatory Risk demonstrate
that no such compensation could possibly have occurred if regulators had
previously set the allowed rate of return equal to the cost of capital. Unless
regulators have found a way to banish hurricanes and environmental disasters,
such regulatory problems are not going away.
The second example concerns assets or contract commitments that could
be "stranded" by competition in areas where a deregulated price of electricity
would be below the regulated price. The magnitude of such stranded costs is
truly staggering.9 Some observers have argued that investors should bear those
costs because they were previously automatically compensated for such risks
6. See id. at 27-41, where we define the problem as depending on the asymmetry of possible
outcomes. See especially id. at 41, where we state: "[in actual situations, there maybe asymmetry
arising from economic forces as well as regulatory actions. For example, . . .the firm may be
subject to both regulatory and competitive constraints . . . ." See also id. at 134, where we use
the "asymmetry" terminology and note that "the source of the problem need not involve regulators
at all." Thus, we are confused by Professor Brown's criticism that "[t]he risk is not regulatory
at all, it is economic." Brown, supra note 1, at 406.
7. Indeed, some are questioning the commitment to competition in the first place. See
Benjamin A. Holden, Power Plays: California's Struggle Shows How Hard It Is to Deregulate
Utilities, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 1995, at Al.
8. See Alfred E. Kahn, A Free 7cket to Rich Telecom Markets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 1995,
at A15 (discussing asymmetric risks faced by incumbents and entrants).
9. See Benjamin A. Holden, Shift to Deregulation May Cost Electricity Industry $135 Billion,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 1995, at B4.
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when regulators equated the allowed rate of return to the cost of capital.'°
The economic principles in Regulatory Risk show that this argument cannot
possibly be sound.
Any principled economic analysis that sheds light on this issue can go a
long way towards resolving perhaps the most contentious issue facing
regulators in developing a transition program towards more competition. As
it turns out, the economic principles of asymmetric risk embodied in
Regulatory Risk imply that even if: (1) investors are fully cognizant of the
risks, (2) capital market prices fully reflect such risks, and (3) regulators
always set the allowed rate of return equal to the true cost of capital, it is
mathematically impossible for investors to have been previously compensated
for these risks."
This point is critical because Professor Brown's focus on the issue of how
the capital came to be invested in the first place 12 makes it appear that the
issue of proper compensation for asymmetric risk turns on the question of the
reasonableness of investor "risk expectations."13 As we explain, "the general
principles apply even when the risk is perfectly perceived by investors. " "
Nor do the principles rely upon a switch in regulatory rules, although the
Duquesne case involved such a switch.' 5
A full explanation of the application of the economics of asymmetric risk
to the problem of stranded costs goes beyond the scope of the present
discussion. 6 However, the issue illustrates what we believe are important
conclusions. First, it would be a grave mistake to consign the theory as a relic
of a bygone era or simply a "theoretical justification for an added element of
expert testimony on the cost of capital on behalf of a utility in a rate case." 7
The theory addresses significant issues facing regulated industries in a new and
more revealing way. Nothing Professor Brown says challenges the economic
principles set forth in the book, although as we point out in the book, there
is a legitimate debate on a case by case basis as to the empirical significance
10. See, e.g., Irwin M. Seltzer, Stranded Investment: Who Pays the Bill?, Remarks
Delivered at Southeastern Electric Exchange (Mar. 30, 1994) (transcript available from American
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research).
11. A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. Tye, It Ain't In There: The Cost of Capital Does Not
Compensate for Stranded-Cost Risk, PuB. UTtL. FORT., May 15, 1995, at 26, 26-28.
12. Brown, supra note 1, at 406.
13. Regardless of "how we got here" (and we believe our logic survives Professor Brown's
doubts on this point), Professor Brown's discussion at this point could be relevant to today's return
requirements only if the return on equity were based on historical rather than current risk --
something like the embedded cost of debt.*
14. See KOLBE, supra note 2, at 101-105.
15. Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
16. See A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. Tye, Compensation for the Risk of Stranded Costs
(July 1995) (working paper in progress).
17. Brown, supra note 1, at 411. In fact, we explain why such a step could be a bad idea
for a utility to pursue. KOLBE, supra note 2, at 53-55.
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of the concepts. Furthermore, the regulatory issues raised by stranded costs
arise from the interaction of competition with regulation, a topic we review
in the book"8 and write about at length elsewhere.19 We therefore cannot
agree with Professor Brown's bifurcation of the issues into "the regulatory
days of yore" governed by "regulatory risks," versus the world of competition
(allegedly the world of today and tomorrow) governed only by "market risks."
With respect to Professor Brown's last concern, we very much regret any
misunderstanding our use of terms such as "moral hazard" may have created.
In economics, "moral hazard" is a value-free descriptive term, not a pejorative
label.2" It merely describes certain situations in which private and social costs
and benefits diverge, and in our usage the term has nothing to do with the
kinds of practices it evidently calls to mind for Professor Brown. We welcome
the suggestion of alternative terminology, but this will not make the problem
discussed in our book go away.2'
Indeed, we regret anything in the book that has contributed to Professor
Brown's lament that "[t]he problem is that these traditional and profound
dilemmas which constitute the regulatory conundrum go largely unrecognized
in a book that seems doggedly determined to retain a narrow focus .. "22
Our broader experience has indeed given us some appreciation of the problems
that regulators and former regulators such as Professor Brown have faced. We
meant no disrespect to their function by pointing out that deeper economic
issues than they had traditionally recognized are part of the overall problem.
Evidently our choice of words gave offense we did not intend.
In summary, we must respectfully but strongly disagree with Professor
Brown's review. Rate regulation will persist for many companies for years to
come. Deregulation of electric distribution is not contemplated, and we are
aware of no serious proposals to let electric utilities have unfettered control
over their transmission systems. Gas distribution companies remain regulated,
and now can be exposed to the gas contracting risks that so harmed the gas
pipeline companies that serve as the case study in our book. Electric generation
is not yet deregulated, and different approaches to such deregulation can and
will allocate $100-$200 billion in potentially stranded costs for utility plant and
overpriced purchased power contracts in very different ways. The principles
18. See KOLBE, supra note 2, at 115-22.
19. See, e.g., William B. Tye & A. Lawrence Kolbe, Optimal Time Structures for Rates in
Regulated Industries, 59 TRANSP. PRAC. J. 176 (1992); Stewart C. Myers et al., Regulation and
Capital Formation in the Oil Pipeline Industry, 23 TRANsp. L.J. 25 (1984); see also Williams Pipe
Line Co., 31 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,337, modified, 33 Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,327 (1985) (discussing FERC's adoption of rate base trended for
inflation in oil pipeline regulation, due in part to intense competition in oil pipeline industry).
20. THE DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMics 298 (David W. Pearce ed., 1983).
21. KOLBE, supra note 2, at 53-54.
22. Brown, supra note 1, at 409.
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in our book are fully relevant today for all of these industries and will remain
so for years, and perhaps decades, to come. Even in-no, especially in-a
world of growing competition, it is far too soon to consign our book to history.
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